Bankruptcy—The Intervention of, Constitutes A Breach of Executory Contract by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 7 Issue 1 
January 1921 
Bankruptcy—The Intervention of, Constitutes A Breach of 
Executory Contract 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, and the Contracts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bankruptcy—The Intervention of, Constitutes A Breach of Executory Contract, 7 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 059 
(1921). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol7/iss1/8 
This Comment on Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington 
University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
KECENT DC ISIONZ
REVIEW OF RECENT DECISIONS
BANKRUPTCY - THE INTERVENTION OF, CONSTITUTES A
BREACH OF EXECUTORY CONIRACT.
It is generally recognind, in the courts of this country, that where a party
bound by an executory contract repudiates his obligations or disables himself
irorn performing them before the time for performance, the promisee has the
option to treat the contract as ended so far as further performance is concerned
and maintain an action at cnc for the damages occasioned by such anticipatory
breach. But a question of profound importance in this connection is whether
or not the intervention of bankruptcy constitutes such a breach-and further-
whether it gives rise to a claim provable irk bankruptcy proceedings.
As a general rule there can be no anticipatory breach of a contract unless
it result from the voluntary act of one of the parties. There are exceptions to
this rule and a very pertinent question for the lawyer is whether or not the
filing of an involuntary petition in bankrtptcy is such an exception. If the
filing of bankruptcy proceedings against a party causes a breach of an execu-
tory contract by that party, it certainly is not a breach resulting from a volun-
tary acL It is evident then that the filing of involuntary proceedings in bank-
ruptcy is an exception to the above rule; or else there is no breach when a
party is unable to perform his contract because of these proceedings.
Then, even though the filing of an involuntary petition in bankruptcy. pre-
venting a party from performing his contract, be admitted a breach of the
contract; does it give rise to such damages as may be proved in the pro-
ceedings?
Both of these points have been decided in the important case of Central
Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Association (240 U. S. 581). The Central
Trust Co. was the trustee in bankruptcy for a transfer company, which before
insolvency had entered into a contract with the defendants in err6r (a hotel
company, plaintiffs in the original action) to handle all baggage for the guests
of the hotel company for a period of five years and to pay them a monthly
consideration for this privilege. Part of the contract had been performed up
to the filing of the bankruptcy petition and the trustees (pls. in error) admitted
the right of the Auditorium Association to recover money due on .the contract
up to the time the proceedings were filed; but maintained that the breach was
due to operation of law, acting through the Bankruptcy Act, and that the
transfer company was not liable for such breach, since it was not a voluntary
act. The trustee argued further that even though it were a breach it did not
give rise to damages provable in bankruptcy proceedings, inasmuch as only
such debts may be proved that exist at the time of the ,filing of the petition
and this debt did not rise until the petition was filed.
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The court in a very well written opinion delivered by Mr. Justice
Pitney decided that bankruptcy petitions, whether voluntary or involuntary, re-
sulting in an adjudicxtion of bankruptcy are the equivalent of an anticipatory
breach of an execatory contract so as to entitle the promisee to prove his claim
in the bankruptcy proceedings.
CONTRACT-BUILDING CONTRACT-LANGUAGE TO BE CON-
STRUED IN ITS PLAIN ORDINARY MEANING.
In the case of Wright-Dalton-Bell-Anchor Store Co. v. Barton, 232 S. W.
1088, (Mo.) involving the construction of a lease a decision is handed down by the
Springfield Court of Appeals contrary to the view take by the St. Louis Court
of Appeals on the same point. In that case a Mrs. Knight leased a lot in
Poplar Bluff, Missouri, to plaintiff for sixteen years, nine months and eight
days at $40.00 per month plus general and special taxes. Later defendant pur-
chased the lot from Mrs. Knight thus becoming responsible under the lease
contract as she had befi. Plaintiff erected a building on said leased lot and
occupied the same under the contract until the expiration of the lease. It was
for the value of this building, as limited by the lease contract for which this
suit was brought.
The provision of the lease upon which plaintiff relied was to the effect
that any buildings or improvements placed on said leased premises were to re-
main its property, and at expiration of lease may be sold to person own-
ing lot (present defendant) if parties could agree upon the amount. If not,
then the plaintiff is to have the right (1) to remove property from premises (2)
to sell to some other person or (3) to release anew upon agreeable terms.
Plaintiff construed this to mean that if he at the expiration of the lease elected
to sell to defendant, defendant would be compelled to buy the improvements.
In the case of Knight v. Orchard, 92 Mo. App. 466, in which a provision
similar to above was contained in a lease the St. Louis Court of Appeals used
language which would seem to support plaintiff's contention in the case at bar.
While it did not directly hold that defendant is bound to buy regardless of his
wishes some such principle must havd been in mind from the conclusion arrived
at in the case. This decision did not, however, affect the decision in the case
at bar for akho the plaintiff recovered in the court below, the Springfield Court
of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that there was no absolute obligation on
the lessor's successor to take and pay for the buildings at the lessee's electicn.
In the construction of a contract all of its provisions must be considered
together and not mere fragmentary parts. The true intention of a contract is
expressed by every term or provision so construed as to be consistent with
every other part. 2 Elliott on Contracts, Sees. 1514 and 1510. It is ordinarily
presumed that the intention of the parties is -expreased by the words of the
whole contract and the court cannot inportl words into a contract which would
make it materially different in a vital particular from what it is. In Haysler
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